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Socratic teaching, the law and professional
identity
Abstract
This paper uses critical discourse analysis of interactions between law students and their lecturer
to show how ‘Socratic’ teaching is used as a powerful technique to shape student identities. Data
from a moot or simulated court in taxation law is analysed to show how students position
themselves and are positioned as legal professionals. The paper argues that one student’s poor
performance in the moot can be interpreted as resistance to attempts to influence her to adopt an
uncongenial speaking position. This example supports the view that the difficulty law students
have in learning to ‘think like a lawyer’ results not from a failure of skill but from the problems
they have in assuming the speaking position of a legal professional. It is suggested that educators
should consider helping students come to terms with the fragmented and contradictory subject
positions associated with professionalisation.
Rod Maclean
Faculty of Education
Deakin University, Geelong
rodm@deakin.edu.au
Socratic teaching, the law and professional
identity
Law students characteristically have a great deal of difficulty learning to write and speak like
professional lawyers. Although legal educators refer to the problem of ‘teaching students to think
like lawyers’ (Fish 1989; Kearney & Beazley 1991; Maurer & Mischler 1994), there is little
consensus about what this means (Bell & Pether 1998; Dias et al. 1999; Lundeberg 1987; Minnis
1994; Phelps 1989; Stratman 1990; White 1983). One view which has considerable support is that
learning to think like a lawyer can be characterised as learning to occupy a professional position
and to acquire a professional legal vision (Fish 1989; Goodrich 1990; Murphy 1994; Schlag
1991).
Professional vision refers to the capacity that professionals have to articulate the world differently
from lay people in order to accomplish their specialised goals. It is a means of constituting
previously unrecognised objects or events that emerge in the course of interpretation from the
interaction of coding schemes and data (Goodwin, C. 1994; Goodwin & Goodwin 1997). Features
of a situation that to the lay observer are unconnected or even imperceptible are to the specialised
eye evidence for the presence of an object or event:
An event being seen, a relevant object of knowledge, emerges through the interplay between a
domain of scrutiny … and a set of discursive practices … being deployed for a specific activity
(Goodwin, C. 1994, p. 606).
Professional vision allows the practitioner to rearticulate the domain of scrutiny in order to focus
on features relevant to the specialised task at hand. Professional vision also makes it possible to
simulate the consequences of decisions and to compare how well each of a range of options
achieve a professional outcome. It enables forwards and backwards reasoning, as professionals
trace the consequences of a decision and then return to modify their initial assumption based on
what they find (Schön 1983).
Many students find the disjunction between an everyday and a professional vision threatening to
their sense of identity. For example, Meyer (1993, p. 790) gives a case study of a first-year law
student from a ‘working class’ ‘immigrant’ background who after initial difficulties managed to
produce an excellent piece of work. When congratulated on her progress, this student responded
that she was thinking of dropping out because in completing her law assignment ‘she was
pretending’, ‘she was forced to speak in a voice that wasn’t “her” voice’. Guinier, Fine and Balin
(1997, p. 28) summarise similar interview data from young female law students who ‘feel their
voices were “stolen” from them during the first year’ and ‘complain that they can no longer
recognize their former selves’. This problem of a rupture between the demands of everyday and
professional writing is not confined to the law (Ivanic 1998). Dias et al. (1999), referring to the
experience of social work interns and graduates working for a government agency, put the point
effectively:
as soon as they begin using the genres of the agency, they buy into the ideology; they learn to live
with contradiction. Such professional genres construct subject positions that may not accord with
their goals, not to be too dramatic, they fragment the personality. It is the price of
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professionalization, so that they may do things as professionals that they are not prepared to do as
persons (p. 234).
This paper uses a case study to illustrate how two law students reacted to attempts to help them to
occupy the position of and to see the world through the eyes of a professional legal practitioner.
Using discourse analysis, the paper shows how a Socratic approach is used to guide students
undertaking a moot or simulated court into thinking like lawyers. The success of the approach in
guiding one student contrasts with its failure to assist the other. It is argued that this failure results
from the student’s refusal to occupy the unacceptable positioning and world view of a tax lawyer.
The case study is drawn from a section of my doctoral thesis (Maclean 2004). It examines the
moot court component of a practical skills program undertaken by students in association with
their final-year subject on taxation. The moot was conducted in a dedicated room on the
university campus furnished in a court-like manner.
The case study deals with two students, whom I refer to as ‘William’ and ‘Emily’. Both William
and Emily had entered the course as school leavers, however both were a little older than their
peers due to illness, course transfer and part time study. William and Emily volunteered to
participate following a request made to their class on my behalf by their lecturer.
William and Emily were acting as senior and junior counsel for the Tax Commissioner in relation
to an objection by a taxpayer against a tax assessment before the Administrative Appeals Tribunal
(AAT). The simulated case deals with a licensed surveyor, Fred Bloggs, who had left a company
of surveyors, Lots of Dough Pty Ltd, and formed his own private company, Mega Bucks Pty Ltd,
as well as a family trust. The Tax Commissioner had amended Fred’s tax assessment to include
all his wife’s income from the family trust. Their lecturer in the course, called ‘Peter’ in this
paper, acted as the member of the AAT before whom the hearing was held.  Submissions were a
combination of written and spoken language as students read from prepared submissions and
responded to interventions from Peter.
A videotape was made of the moot proceedings, and William and Emily’s submissions were
transcribed. The tape and the transcription were analysed using critical discourse analysis (CDA)
methodology (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999; Fairclough 2003; Gee 1999; Toolan 2002). Given
that language lies at the core of the practice of law, critical discourse analysis is the most
appropriate method because it allows detailed examination of language both as the main site
where discursive production of student identity occurs and as the tool used to form identity. The
case study shows at the level of language texture how students take up positions as legal
professionals and are positioned by others.
Using Socratic methods to teach professional vision
In his interactions with William in the moot court Peter uses a Socratic approach. The Socratic
approach complements the case method as the classic technique used in legal education to teach
students to think like lawyers (Schlag 1991; Mertz 1996). However, the Socratic questioning
evident in the moot is quite different from so-called ‘Socratic’ approaches in law classrooms in
which a teacher interrogates students about cases they have prepared in advance (Cole 1984;
Cramton 1982; Kamler & Maclean 1997; Kearney & Beazley 1991; Mehan 1979; Mertz 1996;
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Morgan 1989). Peter’s strategies are more in keeping with the original dialogues of Socrates. He
follows a pattern established in dialogues such as the Meno in which Socrates first asks his
interlocutor to define a concept, then through a series of apparently simple questions elicits
answers that lead to contradiction or absurdity, or that demonstrate that an alternative
interpretation is possible (Plato 1956). For example, Peter does not state outright that a line of
argument is unacceptable but through his questioning seeks to draw attention to relevant features
of the case that William might not have taken into account. He uses reductio ad absurdum on
several occasions to draw attention to absurd or unacceptable consequences of William’s
argument. This use of Socratic strategies through the moot is summarised in Table 1 below.
Table 1 Socratic strategies used by Peter
Alternative explanations
isn’t the accountant’s dominant purpose to get professional fees
why could Fred have been an equal partner with his wife
Absurd or impossible consequences of student’s position (reductio ad absurdum)
if I accept it (     ) would automatically mean every client would loose under a Part IVA
assessment
if I allow you to argue it at that level anyway won’t your client go round and assess every
family discretionary trust in Australia
would you want me to hold that all family businesses don’t count
isn’t that going to be the case with every small family business I mean every plumber every
carpenter and every glazier and whatever in society that’s operating a business and has a
company structure and a family trust and a spouse
Internal inconsistencies in students’ argument
that doesn’t accord with your narrow view of scheme
Counterexamples
if Kerry Packer has a joint bank account with his wife that doesn’t stop the money that he
earned in the company name really being in the company name
why couldn’t couldn’t he have been a partner and equal partner with his wife in which case
the money would have been split down the middle anyway
Other relevant factors or an alternative point of view
but point 7 says any other consequence for the relevant taxpayer so if …
what about the change in the financial position of Lots of Dough
is it relevant that Fred and his company now have a direct liability for negligence and
doesn’t have the same protection that he had as an employee of Lots of Dough in the past so
these are changes aren’t they
doesn’t 177D (iv) demand that I consider the change in the financial position of any person
why weren’t there other financial changes I mean one minute he could have been a sole
proprietor and now he’s a trustee
Sheila takes issue with that she doesn’t think it’s his money to do with what he pleases
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Probes by asking for clarification of a position taken
again that’s a possibility but why is that on balance a probability as the more logical
reasonable hypothesis
how do I decide what’s more important and what’s less important
well it’s a possibility that he would have got it why is it a reasonable expectation that he
would have got it
Peter uses Socratic techniques because they are an effective means of teaching the application of
a set of rules or categories to a particular case or data set (Collins & Stevens 1983). The student
puts up a suggested interpretation of a case, and then the questioner seeks to draw the student’s
attention to faults in his or her reasoning, by drawing attention to relevant factors not taken into
account by the student, by drawing attention to other possible interpretations, or by showing that
the interpretation is in some way incoherent or fails to achieve its aims. For example, the teacher
student conversations presented by Schön (1983) show Socratic methods being used to teach
students to deal with particular cases by searching for interpretations that yield optimal solutions
to a professional problem.
These characteristics of the Socratic approach make it an effective means of teaching professional
vision, which is defined in terms of the interplay of a set of discursive practices and a domain of
scrutiny (Goodwin, C. 1994). In the moot court analysed in this case study, Peter is using a
Socratic approach to teach William the specialised practices associated with Part IVA, the Part of
the Tax Act that deals with tax avoidance. The application of Part IVA can be seen as an example
of professional vision because new objects of knowledge emerge from the interaction of a coding
scheme provided by the Tax Act and a domain of scrutiny provided by the facts of the case. A
series of transactions between trusts and companies is rearticulated as a scheme to avoid tax. This
new representation of the affairs of a taxpayer makes it possible to determine how much net
additional tax the taxpayer would have had to pay (the tax benefit) if the scheme had not been
entered into.
Peter’s Socratic strategies are used to bridge between his judicial role and his educational role
(see also Burns 1997). If he is to remain in role as a judicial figure he cannot intervene directly to
tell William and Emily what to say. What he can do is use questions to expose flaws or
deficiencies in their submissions. The students are forced to position themselves by constructing
their own representations, interpretations and arguments, but can only do so within the parameters
of judicial approval.
This use of the Socratic technique can be seen in the interaction between Peter and William in
Text 1 below. In Text 1 William explores a range of ways of characterising Fred’s affairs as a
scheme to avoid taxation to test which is best suited to achieving the aims of the Tax
Commissioner. Peter elicits from William the hypothetical reasoning typical of tax law. He is
teaching William how to test his tentative attempts to find an ‘object of knowledge’, a scheme to
avoid taxation, against the criteria for what counts as a scheme. Peter shows William how to use
his professional vision to evaluate alternative possible schemes to find the representation that is
most suited to the needs of his client. In learning to apply the Tax Act in this way William is at
the same time reflexively constituting for himself a particular kind of legal identity as a taxation
practitioner.
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Text 1 Extract from William’s moot submission showing Socratic strategies
1 William the very widest scheme we submit that we should reasonably
expect that if he did not enter into that scheme um its widest
sense then he would have become uh a sole proprietor by
himself in his own right
2 Peter why couldn’t couldn’t he have been a partner and equal partner
with his wife in which case the money would have been split
down the middle anyway
Alternative
point of view
3 William he may have been if we were to go directly to the actual facts at
hand and if he hadn’t even gone to to see his accountant which
we include as the first step in wider scheme then he may not
even know about the situation with partnerships or the idea of
entering into one with his wife
4 Peter again that’s a possibility but why is that on balance a
probability as the more logical reasonable hypothesis I mean
wouldn’t I presume that an accountant would talk about the
relative benefits of each type of structure
Probes by
asking for
clarification
5 William well that’s exactly right uh sir but if we assume that he didn’t
go to the accountant because that was the first stage in the
scheme [so but for the scheme
6 Peter [oh I see I see your argument
7 William then he was he was it was most reasonable that um that would
have been the sole proprietor ah if I could deal with the issue of
dominant purpose especially in regards to the largest scheme sir
I wish to emphasise uh section 177D and the words which
occur after oh section 177D B sorry and the words which occur
after the actual the enumeration of the factors which we should
consider um in in particular this idea of a part of a scheme we
believe that on on at the apex of the submission of the
commissioner that the relevant intention the relevant dominant
purpose can most easily be be found in the mind of the
accountant and we believe that the particular part of the scheme
which is most cogent towards our argument is this idea of
splitting the money in the trust
8 Peter so you’re saying the person that triggers 177D is accountant Formulation
9 William we’re saying that we’re saying that um it’s very very arguable
that Fred Bloggs himself could trigger it as far as a state of
mind is concerned but at the apex of our case it’s the accountant
10 Peter but isn’t the accountant’s dominant purpose to get professional
fees that’s why accountants give tax advice to get money not to
get clients tax benefits
Alternative
point of view
11 William you could envisage a situation sir where a professional person
being a lawyer or accountant was giving advice and the advice
could be the most blatant form of tax avoidance uh which  one
could envisage but of course the professional person is seeking
fees and probably very large fees if the advice is that good um
that we would submit is not the relevant purpose which we
should be looking at what we’re looking at here is um a
situation where a private individual has sought the help of
another and the other has given him a scheme or just a course of
events which to follow which can benefit him in this case
benefit him because of tax and that’s the purpose we’re talking
about here he’s employed to provide a specific type of advice
and the advice is happens to have a very large tax  we would
submit and this is the purpose that we’re talking about
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events which to follow which can benefit him in this case
benefit him because of tax and that’s the purpose we’re talking
about here he’s employed to provide a specific type of advice
and the advice is happens to have a very large tax  we would
submit and this is the purpose that we’re talking about
12 Peter I can see the value in your client pursuing this line of arguments
but if I accept it means that any lawyer and accountant who
advertises that they’re in a speciality of giving tax advice would
automatically mean every client would loose under a Part IVA
assessment
Reductio ad
absurdum
In Text 1 William proposes a radical argument. A key part of the definition of a scheme is that the
dominant purpose of a person entering the scheme is to avoid tax. This person does not have to be
the taxpayer who received the tax benefit from the scheme. William is taking advantage of this
feature of the Act to argue that the accountant who offered the tax advice is the person who had
the dominant purpose. In making this argument William is working hard to act like a tax lawyer.
He is seeking to characterise relevant facts of the case in such as way as to meet the interests of
his ‘client’ the tax commissioner. The hypothetical quality of tax law is evident in the language
that he uses: counterfactual conditionals marked by if, modal and subjective verbs if he hadn’t,
would have been, would automatically mean, could envisage, and lexis relating to hypothesis
formation: possibility, assume, hypothesis, probability.
Other signs of William’s investment in the moot can be seen in the way he throws himself into
the role of counsel. Unlike other males present (including Peter) he is wearing a suit. He
addresses Peter as ‘sir’. He uses quaint legal-sounding language like at the apex of our
submission, which is most cogent towards our argument,
In response Peter seeks to further shape William’s professional performance through his
questions and comments. While William’s definition of a scheme meets formal requirements for
adequacy, it is too radical. In seeking to drive a wedge between the taxpayer and his professional
adviser, it undermines one of foundations that the taxation system rests on, and stands no chance
of being accepted in a real tribunal. Peter drives this point home at turn 1.12 above by use of
reductio ad absurdum, demonstrating that acceptance of William’s argument would undermine
the whole system of assessments under Part IVA. This point is followed up in Peter’s closing
comments at the end of the moot by a reminder to William that the lawyer’s role is not to
demonstrate cleverness through radical arguments, but to serve the client’s interests through
careful attention to key features of the law.
Refusing to think like a lawyer
William is good at playing the Socratic game with Peter. His arguments, although unusual,
conform to the expected pattern. He is able to position himself as an apprentice tax lawyer.
Despite being a good student, and despite having demonstrated a good understanding of the issues
in her earlier discussions with William, Emily’s submission to the moot is quite different from
William’s. She does not show the required signs of thinking like a lawyer, and she is in some
sense refusing to play to the game and position herself as a tax lawyer. I argue in this section that
these are signs that Emily is unwilling to make the compromises that would be necessary to allow
her to take on the particular form of legal identity required by the discursive practices of tax law.
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As Text 2 shows, Emily’s argument in the moot is also a radical one: that the company structure
is a fiction; that income received should be treated as Fred’s ordinary income; and that the
company and trust structures should be treated as irrelevant because the income is the product of
Fred’s personal activity and remains in his control. The money is Fred’s, first because he earned it
through his ‘personal exertion’, and second because he had control over it during its path through
the company and the trust. A third argument is based on the fact that all the money comes to the
one joint bank account after is has passed through the company and the trust.
Text 2 Extracts from Emily’s moot submission
1 Emily I suppose um that could be a logical conclusion of what I am arguing I
would say that in this particular circumstance the facts really do indicate that
there is something really not so much awry but there is some there is a
certain element of artificiality that isn’t normally present in most cases
2 Peter that being
3 Emily that being well the fact that Fred Bloggs in this instance um occupies the
position of almost like a holy trinity that is he is not only the director of the
company well employee of the company director of the company he is um
trustee of the trust he is also beneficiary of the trust and he operates in that
environment without the although his wife is related in that she is also an
director um and thus of the company and thus effectively a trustee and a
beneficiary because by her own admission in the um her testimony she said
you know I follow um I generally follow what Fred tells me to do you can
sort of see that um the facts allude to that Fred really is operating on his own
he’s not really drawing on the opinions of um extraneous third parties he is
sort of um operating for his own benefits and his own you know um uh yeah
at his own discretion which [as a trustee
4 Peter [isn’t that going to be the case with every small family business I mean
every plumber every carpenter and every glazier and whatever in society
that’s operating a business and has a company structure and a family trust
and a spouse
5 Emily I suppose again we go back to the issue of the purpose for that and in this
instance the artificiality seems to stem from a purpose of attempting to avoid
tax rather than really genuinely wanting to provide for his family
6 Peter well if what you’re concerned about an attempt to avoid tax then obviously
your colleague’s argument about Part IVA are relevant because that’s where
parliament said that’s important you’re really asking me to do something
more fundamental you’re asking me to say that that that the real essence of
income means that if it really is his effort and his control it ought to be his
money and I ought to ignore what other branches of the law don’t ignore
which is companies and contracts and things like that now I’m not now I’m
not now I may be politically disposed to that but give me something to hang
my hat on I can’t find in your favour unless you give me dividing line that
7 Emily uh huh
8 Peter lets all of the ordinary plumbers go and catches what what you think’s
wrong with Fred tell me what distinguishes him what or what what legal
proposition do you want me to adopt  that would allow you to win this case
and not allow every other person running a family business to be caught
 [section of transcript deleted]
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9 Peter don’t you have a bit of a problem with Leidig’s case I mean again it’s
Federal Court decision this is merely the tribunal and Mr Justice Hill was
scathing of this line of argument that you’re currently embarking on the
whole idea that there’s this thing called personal services income and he
looks around at the cases and he says I can’t find this broad proposition that
the commissioner’s asserting
10 Emily hmmhuh
11 Peter well if he says he can’t find it well why should I find it
12 Emily well I think um there is a number of ways that we can distinguish Leidig um
and one
13 Peter well you can distinguish the facts but [you’ve got to give me a proposition
14 Emily [yeah     mmhuh
15 Peter you’ve got to give me a legal principle from somewhere you either find one
directly from the statute and your colleague’s dealt with Part IVA or you
pluck a common law one of the air as the commissioner tried in Leidig and
Mr Justice Hill says it’s not there I can’t find it I can’t find cases that
establish it I can’t find words in the act that establish it uh it might be a nice
philosophical idea but it’s not law so where do I find this proposition even if
you tell me there are many distinguishing facts between this and Leidig
what’s the proposition and where does it come from
At turn 1.4 Peter uses a reductio ad absurdum, demonstrating to Emily, as he did to William, that
her form of argument is unacceptable because it undermines the foundations on which the law
rests. However it is noticeable how after turn 1.4 the pattern of the exchange alters. Peter moves
from the indirection of the Socratic approach to more extended turns in which he explicitly tells
Emily what is wrong with her position and asks her to produce a different kind of argument.
This shift is caused by Emily’s refusal to play the game and to argue like a tax lawyer. Instead she
seems to be conducting a personal crusade against the artificiality of arrangements that people
enter into to avoid tax. Emily’s arguments means that she is not engaging with Peter in the same
way as William. Peter is challenged by Emily’s refusal to ‘think like a lawyer’ and to argue in a
legal way. Rather than the indirection of the Socratic approach, Peter asks, almost pleads with,
Emily to produce an argument that is demonstrably legal in character: a dividing line, a legal
principle, a proposition, something to hang my hat on (turns 2.6, 2.15).
Emily is not incapable of arguing in the way that Peter expects. Rather she is incapable of or
unwilling to be positioned in the role demanded of a tax lawyer. This is evidenced by her constant
repetition of essentially similar arguments, despite their legal inadequacy having been pointed out
not only by Peter in the moot, but also by William and by Emily herself in the discussion
preceding the moot.
Feminist work on tax law offers a possible explanation of the reasons for Emily’s stance. By
writing the texts of taxation law, as she does by making her submission to the moot, Emily is
being made complicit in ‘the effect of the author as performing the original model of, God-like,
‘naturally’/symbolically giving life to new artificial bodies’ (Grbich 1997, p. 88), and she is in
danger of producing herself as an agent of a patriarchal symbolic order she finds unpalatable.
Although Peter implores her to give him an argument based on legal doctrine (turn 2.6), Emily
cannot oblige him precisely because she does not want to insert a dividing line but rather opts to
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preserve a totality. She does not want to assume the position of creating objects that did not
previously exist and partitioning the world in new ways (Grbich 1997; Williams 1995). She
refuses to assume the ‘God-like’ power of the taxation lawyer to constitute new objects and new
subjects by representational practices that destroy common sense. She is working at the level of
the image, rather than at the level of legal argument (Goodrich 1997).
Her attempt to restore the lost totality of Fred’s business resists the pressure to create artificial
bodies like companies and schemes. Emily’s dream is to restore the lost unity Fred Bloggs’
nuclear family that has been dismembered by an accountant into a company and a family trust
where the family members play multiple roles as company directors, trustees, beneficiaries, and
employees. The company introduces a ‘corporate veil’, or in William’s words, a ‘pane of glass’,
that partitions Fred’s activities. These fictitious structures are opposed by Emily to the unity of
the family bank account and the physical exertion of Fred the worker. Emily refers to Fred as the
‘holy trinity’, a powerful image of the one in the many (turn 2.3), Emily is producing herself not
as a creator of schemes, but as someone who opposes the artificiality and relativity of Part IVA
with a return to the foundational and realist concept of ordinary income. This vein of argument is
evident in turn 2.5 above as well as in other parts of Emily’s submission (Texts 3, 4 and 5).
Text 3 The artificiality of Fred’s affairs (1)
Emily what I suppose my argument is leading towards is that the result of
the way they have organised their affairs can be seen as a fiction
because ultimately the money only ends up in one place and that is
ultimately at Fred’s control to do with as he pleases
Text 4 The artificiality of Fred’s affairs (2)
Emily it is all being taken out at the end of the financial year which to all
intents and purposes is merely just a book um a bookkeeping exercise
is not really a reflection of the reality of the situation
Text 5 The artificiality of Fred’s affairs (3)
Emily all the money earned as a result of his activities as a licensed surveyor
um going via the company or whatever um would have ultimately
have ended up in the bank account and at his control and discretion
regardless of what chain of events took in the middle it ultimately
would have um come yeah ended up in his hands
Texts 2-5 demonstrate a consistent theme running through Emily’s submission of opposition
between the artificial and the real. On the one hand is artificiality, fiction, merely a bookkeeping
exercise, and on the other hand, a string of adverbs representing reality, genuinely, ultimately,
really and references to a single locus of control, in one place, in the bank account, in his hands,
at Fred’s control.
Conclusion
This paper shows how Socratic teaching is used in a moot court to assist one student, William, to
compliantly assume the professional identity of a tax lawyer. One the other hand, Emily’s poor
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performance in the moot is interpreted as a refusal to assume the some of the modes of argument
characteristically used by taxation practitioners.
Emily’s concerns are not unusual. Students often find it difficult to take on representational or
discursive practices that conflict with a personal view of the world, and react strongly to
perceived threats to deeply-held beliefs. Educators need to be able to recognise and value this
response as a sign of a deep engagement with the field, rather than treating it as irrational.
Students should be helped to construct speaking and writing positions which allow them to
reconcile the conflicting demands made on them by their personal and professional allegiances.
This is only possible when educators recognise and value the multiple positions that students
bring to their professional learning.
Responses such as Emily’s have an ethical as well as an ontological dimension. As educators we
have acquired ethical blind spots through our own formation and as a result fail to recognise
students’ justified concerns with morally ambiguous professional practices. Part of the role of the
legal educator is to harden students to the violence and injustice associated with the legal
profession. Baker refers to Mertz’s (2000) work on Socratic dialogue in as inculcating students
with a ‘legal discourse [that] robs legal disputants and legal trainees of the narrative, social, and
ethical factors that animate moral discourse about social disputes and systematic oppression in the
“real world”’ (Baker 2000, p. 132). The same applies to other forms of professional education, as
seen in the reference above to Dias et al’s (1999) study on social work. As educators and
educational researchers we as members of this conference are all complicit in shaping students to
make them to fit into the unjust institution of education. It is important that we should be honest
with ourselves about the enterprise we are engaged in so that we can mitigate its effects and so
that we at least do not blame students for their concerns at the actions they have to take in
learning to become educational professionals.
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